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PATENT PROTECTION OF
PHARMACOLOGICALLY ACTIVE
METABOLITES: THEORETICAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ON THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF FOUR REGIONS*
Richard Li-dar Wang† and Pei-Chen Huang††
Abstract
Active metabolite patents have been instrumental for brandname pharmaceutical companies to maintain their exclusivity even
after the drug patents expire. This strategy obstructs market entry of
generic medicine and reduces affordable drugs. The authors review
jurisprudence from the United States, Europe, India, and Taiwan in
search for practical solutions to confront this problem. Given the
unique pharmacological value that active metabolites may possess,
patent protection for those purified or synthesized in vitro should be
preserved, but for those produced by metabolism should be declined.
Except India, most countries under investigation comport with this
dichotomy. Their jurisprudence may be subsumed into three possible
solutions. The United States and the United Kingdom adopt the
inherent anticipation doctrine; yet depriving artisan recognition of
novelty analysis makes this doctrine highly controversial. The product
of nature doctrine gravely suffers from incoherence and uncertainty
in judging patentability. The non-practice theory, as articulated by
Taiwan’s Intellectual Property (IP) Court, avoids these shortcomings.
The unambiguity and sound rationale further support this theory to be
the preferable solution among the three.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Considering the theoretical foundations of the patent system
from a utilitarian perspective,1 the basic rationale for the existence of
patent rights is to trigger a series of economic activities that benefit
society by providing inventors (or their successors) with the legal
right to exclude others from practicing their inventions (right to
exclude). Innovation and invention are sources of technological
improvement for society. However, because innovations possess the
characteristics of public goods, they are often appropriated by
competitors, resulting in free riding.2 Providing inventors with
exclusive rights can prevent competitors from copying inventions
without their permission and destroying the opportunity to recover
their research and development costs from the market. In this

1. See generally Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 31, 47-48 (1989).
2. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-26 (1989).
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situation, patents act as incentives to invent. They encourage
exploration of new inventions, and prevent free riding that may result
in an insufficient investment of research and development.3
Additionally, when new inventions are developed, they must
undergo a lengthy process of commercialization. Adequate product
designs and efficient manufacturing processes must be instigated,
which enable technological inventions to be actually applied to
commercial commodities, thereby being employed in the market and
benefiting the consuming public. Patents can provide incentives to
commercialize as well. The protection of patent rights can attract
necessary
funding for supporting the expenditure of
commercialization and market development. Furthermore, due to the
fact that inventors have to disclose the technological content of their
innovations when applying for patents, the exclusive patent terms
induce inventors from keeping their innovations confidential.4 This is
a major incentive to disclose new technical development, and an
important method for encouraging public accumulation and exchange
of state-of-the-art technological information.5
However, the awarding of exclusive patent terms creates
conflicting interest between inventors and the public. This conflict
occurs in the pharmaceutical field as well. Drug patents can satisfy
the profit demands of pharmaceutical manufacturers, and assist with
accumulating and sustaining research and development funding and
capability. However, the fact that patent protection excludes
unlicensed generic manufacturers from producing the same drug often
runs contrary to the patient’s need for affordable medicine.
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies often prosecute and obtain
secondary patents to further extend the exclusivity period of brandname drugs, which usually comes from primary patents on active
ingredients of the drugs, so as to block generic manufacturers even
longer and pursue the brand-name manufacturers’ own interests. This
strategy creates the phenomenon of “patent evergreening.”6 Medical
products and pharmaceuticals are indispensable resources for saving
human life and health. Extending brand-name exclusivity over time
3. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1024-28; Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits
of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227,
229 (2001).
4. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1028-30.
5. Id.
6. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 401 n.44 (1999); Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights
in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005).

WANG & HUANG

492

4/18/2013 1:28 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 29

through secondary patents not only runs counter to fairness and
equality, but is also closely related to public health. Recently, this
problem of drug patent evergreening has received significant
international attention. That suggests this troublesome issue is
gradually spreading throughout the world, and urgently requiring
proper resolution.
The issue of evergreening drug patents is potentially resolvable
from two angles: patentability and rights enforcement. Technically,
secondary patents are normally derived from the active ingredient of
the drug, including its enantiomers, position isomers, geometrical
isomers, homologues, crystalline forms, and so on. The authors
choose to focus on active metabolites, of which the patentability and
infringement litigation have been controversial in recent years. In this
study, they thoroughly investigate the jurisprudence of different
countries, engaging in a technical and legal assessment of their
approaches to this issue, and critically evaluating their advantages and
disadvantages respectively.
This article begins with a brief introduction of pharmacologically
active metabolites, the role they play in pharmaceutical treatment, and
the controversies they may bring about in patent law. In Parts III
through VI, the authors examine, respectively, how the United States,
Europe, India, and Taiwan manage the patentability and enforcement
issues arising from active metabolites. In Part VII, the authors
introduce insightful theoretical perspectives and technological
analysis, subsuming the jurisprudence of those four regions into three
potential solution models. The article further addresses the questions
whether these models are consistent with the role of active
metabolites in pharmaceutical research, and whether patent law is
aiming at encouraging valuable inventions instead of monetizing
basic pharmaceutical principles that are not truly innovative. Finally,
the conclusion of this study is summarized in Part VIII.
Pharmacologically active metabolites are produced by the human
metabolism, which is purely a natural reaction of the human body, not
subjectively known to or controlled by the patient who is taking the
medicine. This reaction is not based on conscious behavior by
humans, but instead constitutes an automatic biological mechanism
that is part of the digestion system. Metabolites are therefore much
closer to products of nature than to human inventions. It seems
inadequate to grant patents on those substances. Nevertheless, the
discovery and in vitro manufacturing of these substances has
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considerable technological value in the pharmaceutical industry.7
Therefore, the awarding of patents to this type of metabolites should
still be permitted. This study concludes that the product of nature
doctrine8 and the non-practice theory9 can both yield the same end
result. However, because the product of nature doctrine may present
risks of excessively denying patents for other types of pharmaceutical
research results, it would be more appropriate to adopt the nonpractice theory articulated by Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Court in
their judgment.
II. ACTIVE METABOLITES AND PATENT LAW
When pharmacologically active ingredients are used in the body,
some of the compounds are absorbed and directly produce
physiological effects, whereas others must undergo a series of
metabolic reactions to achieve the desired result. A number of cases
have indicated that the metabolites of the original compounds are
pharmacologically active as well. Additionally, studies have found
that the pharmacological effect of some compounds originates
entirely from their metabolites, meaning the administered compound
is itself inactive. The desired pharmaceutical effect can be obtained
only through the body’s natural metabolism and the resulting
metabolites.10 Because of the limited current knowledge into human
physiology, pharmaceutical firms typically do not understand how a
drug works on the pharmacological level when putting it on the
market. It sometimes takes a number of years after launching the drug
for those companies to figure out the pharmacokinetic mechanism of
that drug and then apply for a patent on the active metabolite.
The chemical structure of pharmacologically active metabolites
differs from the compounds originally administered. Theoretically, it
is patentable if a metabolite is novel, non-obvious, and possess
sufficient utility. However, granting patents on active metabolites has
sparked significant controversies, the core issue of which is whether
the intake or marketing of drugs known to generate specific active
metabolites actually infringes patents covering the metabolites of
those drugs. In practice, after drug patents have expired,
7.
8.

See infra Part VII.A for a specific example and further explanations.
See infra Part VII.C. See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PATENT LAW 226-29 (2d ed. 2006).
9. See infra Part VII.D.
10. PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 231 (4th ed.
2004).

WANG & HUANG

494

4/18/2013 1:28 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 29

pharmaceutical manufacturers alternatively assert active metabolite
patents, if any, against those who manufacture and sell generics of the
same drug, in an attempt to extend their market exclusivity in real
terms. Consequently, active metabolites have become the subject of
secondary pharmaceutical patents. Patents on active metabolites thus
might delay the arrival of generic drugs on the market, which prevents
the public from enjoying the benefit of more affordable medicine after
the original patent has expired.
Since active metabolites are arguably just the flip side of the
original pharmaceutical compounds, this type of extending brandname exclusivity is somewhat frustrating in light of the basic rationale
of the patent system, which is to promote innovation,
commercialization and technology disclosure with only a limited
period of exclusivity.11 However, active metabolites are also just a
type of chemical compounds, and denying patent protection for a
new, useful and non-obvious metabolite would be contrary to the
principles of modern patent laws. In the following chapters, the
authors investigate the relevant jurisprudence of the United States,
Europe, India, and Taiwan, with an aim of exploring and identifying
feasible solutions to reconcile this dilemma.
III. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN U.S. LAW
The first U.S. case that deals with the issue of active metabolites
is Zenith v. Bristol-Meyers,12 where the Federal Circuit considers the
patent claims might encompass active metabolites, yet reverses the
ruling of induced infringement below for the reason that no evidence
in the record rightly comparing the patent claims with the drug that
allegedly formed the active metabolites after being ingested by
patient.13 In a number of later cases, however, U.S. courts are inclined
to hold that the sale or use of drugs known to produce specific active
metabolites does not constitute an infringement of active metabolite
patents. Those opinions include varying reasons to reach this
conclusion.14

11. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
12. Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
13. Id. at 1421-24.
14. For an overview of U.S. cases tackling the active metabolite issue, see Andrew W.
Torrance, Physiological Steps Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1471, 1478-99 (2008).
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A. Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
The court in Marion Merrell Dow uses claim construction to
pass a judgment of non-infringement.15 Merrell Dow held the U.S.
Patent No. 3,878,217 (’217) that claimed the compound terfenadine
and its use as a treatment for human allergic reactions. The ’217
patent expired in 1994, when Baker Norton submitted an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), hoping to manufacture and sell the
corresponding generic drug after the patent expired. Merrell Dow
initiated infringement litigation after learning of this submission,
alleging that Baker Norton’s manufacturing and selling of the generic
terfenadine infringes the unexpired Patent No. 4,254,129 (’129), also
held by Merrell Dow. The ’129 patent covers terfenadine’s active
metabolite, terfenadine acid metabolite (TAM), and its use as a
treatment for allergic reactions. Merrell Dow argued that Baker
Norton’s manufacture and sale of the generic drug would constitute
active inducement of infringement because TAM would be produced
in patients’ livers after consuming Baker Norton’s generic drug.16
Baker Norton subsequently filed a counterclaim, arguing that because
patients were already using TAM prior to the application for the ’129
patent, and TAM had already implicitly been disclosed in the ’217
specification, TAM was anticipated by the ’217 patent and thus lost
its novelty.
In this case, the court focused on construing the claim terms of
the ’129 patent. The court indicated that its primary task for literal
infringement analysis involves defining the meaning and scope of the
claims at question. The court has the authority and obligation to
interpret the textual meaning of the claims, taking into consideration
the intrinsic evidence such as the specification and prosecution
history.17 In this case, the claim term in dispute was the word
“compound.” Merrell Dow asserted that this term covers TAM
produced in vivo through the liver’s metabolism and those
synthesized in vitro as well. Baker Norton countered that the same
word represents only TAM that was synthesized in vitro.18 The court

15. Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Fla.
1996).
16. Id. at 1051-53.
17. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
18. Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 1053-54.
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pointed out in its ruling that although the claim did not clearly define
the production method of the “compound,” it also contained nothing
suggesting that TAM was generated through human metabolism. The
court indicated that Claim 10 of the disputed patent recited the
pharmaceutical composition of TAM in unit dosage form, which
involved the combination of an effective amount of TAM with a
“significant amount of a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier,” and
hence the claim should rightly be restricted to TAM obtained from in
vitro synthesis. On the other hand, if the claim included TAM both
produced through in vivo metabolism and in vitro synthesis, as
alleged by Merrell Dow, it could only cover the in vivo TAM that had
been extracted from the human body, and combined with the
pharmaceutical carrier after purification. However, this seemed
unreasonable to the court and in pharmaceutical practice. Based on
this construction, the court decided that the “compound” in the
disputed patent should be restricted to TAM obtained from in vitro
synthesis.19
The court further stated that patent specifications should be
consulted when constructing claims. The specification of the disputed
patent explained in detail TAM’s chemical formula, efficacy, and
usage. However, it lacked the information that TAM could be
produced by human metabolism. This implies that “compound” in the
disputed patent claim should be restricted to in vitro synthesis.
Additionally, the prosecution history of a patent constitutes other
primary evidence that should be considered when constructing
claims.20 The court stated that Claims 1 and 2 of the disputed patent
were virtually identical when initially presented by Merrell Dow. The
only difference between Claims 1 and 2 was that Claim 2 specified
the compound as “an essentially pure compound of TAM.” The patent
examiners rejected the claims on the basis that “no appropriate
distinction exist[ed] between these two claims in the specification.”
Merrell Dow then withdrew Claim 2 to get Claim 1 allowed by the
examiner. Furthermore, Merrell Dow acquiesced to the patent
examiners’ interpretation that the term “compound” in Claim 1 is
restricted to pure TAM by withdrawing Claim 2. The court pointed
out that this type of behavior, where a patent applicant had restricted
the range of her claims during patent prosecution and then later
attempted during litigation to recover what she previously had

19.
20.

Id. at 1054.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
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forfeited, should be strictly prohibited.21 On this basis, the court held
that “compound” in the disputed claim should be restricted to in vitro
synthesis. Thus, the TAM produced by the metabolism of patients
consuming terfenadine did not fall within the scope of the ’129 patent
and did not constitute a direct infringement. As a result, Baker
Norton’s manufacturing and selling of generic terfenadine did not
constitute active inducement of infringement.22 Merrell Dow’s
subsequent appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) was dismissed by the parties, ending litigation.23
B. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In this later case,24 the U.S. court used the “inherent anticipation
doctrine” to address the issue of whether selling and using the original
drugs constituted an infringement of active metabolite patents. In this
case, the plaintiff Schering Corp. held U.S. Patent Nos. 4,282,233 and
4,659,716. The ’233 patent claimed loratadine, an antihistamine
substance, which was used to suppress allergic reactions without the
side effect of drowsiness. Schering Corp. labeled loratadine as the
active component of the drug bearing the brand name Claritin. The
’716 patent claimed descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), another
antihistamine compound and the active metabolite of loratadine, did
not cause drowsiness either. The ’716 patent did not expire until April
2004, whereas the ’233 patent expired earlier in 2003. After the ’233
patent expired, a number of pharmaceutical companies intended to
manufacture and sell the generic version of loratadine, which needed
the FDA approval. Since the Schering Corp enlisted the ’716 patent in
the Orange Book as patents protecting its Claritin product, generic
producers in order to obtain FDA approval of their ANDA
submissions asserted that the patent is invalid. In response, Schering
Corp. initiated infringement litigations against Geneva and a number
of other generic manufacturers.25
While engaging in claim construction, the trial court held that the
claim to DCL in the ’716 patent included both “production through
metabolism” and “in vitro synthesis.” Both parties agreed to this
interpretation. The trial court stated that the ’233 patent did not
21. Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 1055-56.
22. Id. at 1057.
23. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 152 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (unpublished table decision).
24. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. II), 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
25. Id. at 1375-76.
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explicitly disclose DCL or references to metabolites of loratadine.
However, DCL is inevitably produced and present as a metabolite
when following the method of administering loratadine as specified in
the ’233 patent. Applying this claim construction, the trial court
determined that the DCL claim in the ’716 patent is already inherently
anticipated by the ’233 patent. Thus, the claim failed the novelty
requirement and was therefore invalid.26
Schering Corp. appealed to the CAFC, and the appellate court
passed a judgment substantially identical to the ruling of the trial
court. The CAFC stated that when a single earlier reference had
exposed all of the technological features of the claimed invention
under dispute, the patent was invalid because the invention was
anticipated and its novelty was thus lost. Furthermore, even if the
piece of prior art did not disclose a certain technological feature of the
disputed invention, if the omitted element is inherently implied or had
to be present according to the disclosure of that reference, the
disputed invention was anticipated as well.27 The appellate court
further suggested that according to previous case law, the application
of the inherent anticipation doctrine did not demand that the person
having ordinary skilled in the art (PHOSITA) had to recognize the
omitted element being inherent in the prior reference. If the
technological feature that the reference failed to expressly describe
had to be formed or was present when following the teaching of a
single prior art, regardless of whether a PHOSITA could identify the
omitted element or not, the inherent anticipation doctrine still applied,
and the disputed claim was invalid due to a lack of novelty.28
The court further explained that in the earlier Continental Can
case,29 the court’s rationale did not demand that the PHOSITA having
to recognize all omitted elements from a single prior art before the
inherent anticipation doctrine could be applied. The Continental Can
decision only stated that the court could consult with the PHOSITA to
clarify the disclosure of specific former references, including the
technological features that were missing but inherently implied. The
CAFC did not accept the argument advocated by Schering Corp. that
“the PHOSITA recognizing the omitted elements” is a necessary
condition for inherent anticipation. Regardless of whether the

26. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 54042 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
27. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1377.
28. Id.
29. Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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PHOSITA realized that the ’233 patent inherently embraced the
compound DCL at the filing date of the ’716 patent, the inherent
anticipation doctrine might still be applicable.30
The CAFC noted that the facts of this case differed from
previous ones, where the inherent anticipation doctrine was applied.
In those cases, portions of technological features claimed in the
disputed patent had already been explicitly disclosed in a prior
reference, while only some features were inherently implied. In this
case, however, the ’233 patent failed to explicitly disclose any
features of DCL. Thus, the focus of applying the inherent anticipation
doctrine in this instance was not any specific omitted features but
rather DCL as a whole.31 Nevertheless, the CAFC held that the main
consideration for determining whether the claimed subject matter had
been omitted yet was inherent in a prior reference was whether the
cited reference had placed the subject matter in the public domain;
that is, whether the general public had already freely made, used or
sold the subject matter. Patents cannot be awarded to retrieve
inventions from the public domain to the patentee’s proprietary
terrain. Therefore, “if granting patent protection on the disputed claim
would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the
prior art, then that claim is anticipated.”32 This basic principle persists
regardless of whether the PHOSITA understands all of the
configuration or underlying scientific knowledge of the prior art
reference. Therefore, the court ruled that the inherent prior art
anticipated the entire invention as well as single elements within an
invention.33 In this case, the scientific data showed that the use of
loratadine necessarily resulted in the DCL compound through human
metabolism. The court finally ruled that the ’233 patent inherently
anticipated the DCL claims in the ’716 patent.34
The CAFC further distinguished the conditions in this case with
those in cases of accidental anticipation.35 In the present case, DCL
was not produced accidentally or under unusual situations, rather
30. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1377-78.
31. Id. at 1378-79.
32. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
33. Id. at 1380.
34. Id.
35. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). Cf. Chem. Cleaning, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 379 F.2d 294, 29697 (5th Cir. 1967). Monomethylthiourea breaks down and produces thiourea as claimed in the
patent when applied to industrial boilers. This conversion is intentional and does not happen in
human bodies.
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unavoidably generated when administering loratadine in ordinary
circumstances. The formation of DCL was an intrinsic outcome of
patients consuming loratadine.36 Moreover, the CAFC pointed out
that a qualified prior art reference capable of refuting a disputed
invention’s novelty must allow a PHOSITA to make or use the prior
art accordingly. Although the ’233 patent did not describe how to
manufacture the isolated DCL compound, disclosure of “any” method
capable of manufacturing DCL would have sufficed to satisfy the
enablement requirement under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112.37 Since patients consuming loratadine had already been
described in the ’233 patent, and DCL will necessarily be generated in
the human body, the court found that the ’233 patent was an enabling
prior art that inherently anticipated the DCL claims of the ’716
patents.38
C. Analysis
U.S. courts have so far adopted different approaches to reach the
same conclusion of non-infringement on the issue whether the
manufacturing, sale or consuming of drugs known to produce specific
active metabolites infringes on patents claiming those metabolites. In
the two sets of cases, the patents at bar were similarly drafted, both
containing claims to the active metabolites, claims to the processes of
synthesizing the active metabolites in vitro, claims to combinations of
the active metabolites and drug carriers, and claims to the
metabolites’ methods of use. The court in Merrell Dow used claim
construction as an instrument to resolve the dispute on active
metabolites. In Schering Corp., however, the CAFC eschewed claim
construction and resorted to the inherent anticipation doctrine. The
reason for this disparity might come from the fact that both parties in
Schering Corp. conceded as to the interpretation of the key claim term
“compound” to be limited.39
More importantly, the way that the CAFC explains inherent
anticipation in Schering Corp. has incited numerous theoretical and

36. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1378.
37. Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation
Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1144-54 (2008) (arguing for a heightened enablement
requirement for patent-defeating prior art reference, in order to avoid using the inherent
anticipation doctrine).
38. Id. at 1149.
39. A third approach that U.S. courts have ever used to address the issue of active
metabolites is the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, No. 90-0242,
1990 WL 121353, at *11-14 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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practical discussions.40 After this decision, obtaining patents for
active metabolites has increased in difficulty, because a patent claims
an active metabolite only through its chemical formula, the inherent
anticipation doctrine still applies, potentially anticipating such a
claim. It is noteworthy, however, that the Schering Corp. decision did
not totally deny any patent protection for active metabolites. The
court indicated in this decision that patents can be granted on purified
or isolated active metabolites, or on their methods of use or
composition with other substances.41
IV. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN EUROPEAN LAW
In comparison, the European Patent Office (EPO) holds a
conservative stance on the inherent anticipation doctrine. In light of
controversies regarding this doctrine, the EPO has not adopted it so
far, thus refrained from denying categorically the novelty of active
metabolite inventions.42 However, does administering a drug infringe
on its active metabolite patent, and consequently manufacturing
generics of this drug constitute active inducement of infringement?
The EPO’s sole responsibility concerns patent examination and
awarding, not handling patent infringement litigation. Thus, the courts
of each European nation independently decide the controversy
described above.
In the case of Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton
Pharmaceuticals Inc., the plaintiff Merrell Dow used the same
arguments to file infringement suits against the defendant Baker
Norton in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
courts of the three countries all employed different reasoning to reach
the same conclusion of non-infringement. In Germany, the Munich
District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of equity.
The court found the compound manufactured and marketed by the
defendant to be identical to the terfenadine claimed in the plaintiffowned expired patent. However, the court further reasoned that when

40. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. III), 348 F.3d 992,
993-96 (Fed. Cir. 2003); H. Sam Frost, The Unique Problem of Inventions Which Are Fully
Enabled and Fully Described, But Not Fully Understood (Merrell Dow’s Terfenadine
Revisited),
20
INTELL.
PROP.
J.
369
(2007),
available
at
http://www.bereskinparr.com/files/file/docs/PatentTerfenadineFrost.pdf; Ben Herbert, Note,
When Nature’s Anticipation Inherently Prevents Your Discovery: A New Look at an Overlooked
Requirement of Patentability and Its Impact on Inherent Anticipation, 50 JURIMETRICS 111
(2009). For further discussion of the inherent anticipation doctrine, see infra Part VII.B.
41. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1381.
42. GRUBB, supra note 10, at 233.
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the allegedly infringing behavior is entirely within the scope of
exclusive rights of an expired patent, this behavior cannot infringe on
any other valid patent. The plaintiff later appealed to the German
Higher District Court, which agreed with the district court’s
judgment. It further elaborated that any person can freely use
technologies from expired patents, since the patentees of those
technologies have been amply rewarded during the earlier exclusivity
period of the corresponding patents. Finally, Merrell Dow appealed to
the German Federal Supreme Court, which denied review of its
appeal, therefore finalizing the lower court’s judgment.43 In summary,
both German and U.S. courts in this case did not invalidate the
controversial claims of active metabolites, but merely maintained that
the defendant’s behavior was outside the scope of indirect
infringement.
Conversely, the court in the United Kingdom invoked the
inherent anticipation doctrine to address this infringement action. The
court held the active metabolite claims at issue to be invalid, therefore
finding no patent infringement by the defendant.44 As part of the
claim construction, the House of Lords45 ruled that the disputed TAM
compound claim encompasses both TAM produced through
metabolism in the human body and synthesized in vitro. The court
analyzed this dispute by differentiating two types of anticipation:
anticipation by use and by disclosure. Specifically, Lord Hoffman
discussed the novelty issue in the alternative by answering the
following two questions: (1) Does patients’ use of TAM prior to the
filing date of the disputed patent constitute prior art to the claim in
that patent, thus defeating its novelty? (2) Or does the disclosure of
the earlier dated ’217 patent similarly constitute prior art to the
disputed patent’s claim? The House of Lords then stated that although
the EPO’s decision is non-binding on the U.K. courts, since the
European Patent Convention (EPC) shall be followed by all
contracting countries with the EPO being an important agency in
interpreting this convention, the EPO’s opinions should be respected
by the U.K. courts.

43. Frost, supra note 40, at 380-81.
44. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. H. N. Norton & Co., [1996] R.P.C. 76 (UKHL 1995).
45. Before the U.K. Supreme Court established operations in October 2009, the House of
Lords was the highest judicial authority in the United Kingdom. Twelve Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary (Law Lords) tried cases appealed from appellate courts. See Introduction to the Justice
System:
The
House
of
Lords,
JUDICIARY
OF
ENG.
AND
WALES,
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/introduction-to-justice-system/the-house-oflords (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
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Regarding the anticipation by patients’ prior use of TAM, the
court by referring to previous EPO cases,46 held that only when prior
usage provides the sufficient and necessary information of the
disputed invention to enable a PHOSITA to practice it, does this
usage defeat the novelty of the invention at issue. In the case of TAM,
patients were entirely unaware that after administering terfenadine
their bodies would automatically generate TAM to achieve the
desired pharmaceutical effect. Thus, this use alone did not disclose
any technological features of TAM, and neither did it enable the
PHOSITA to practice the invention of the TAM compound.
Consequently, the invention of the TAM compound maintained its
novelty despite the patients’ prior use of terfenadine.47
Nevertheless, the House of Lords ruled that the technical
disclosures in the ’217 patent still defeated the novelty of the TAM
claim. Their key point in determining this issue was whether the prior
patent provided enough information to enable a PHOSITA to practice
the disputed invention. The House of Lords states that although the
’217 patent did not disclose how to manufacture pure TAM, it
described how administering terfenadine will produce chemical
reactions in the patient’s body and thereby achieving antihistamine
effects, which the House of Lords deemed sufficient to allow “any
person” to produce TAM through metabolism. In other words, the
technical disclosure in the ’217 patent provided sufficient information
to enable the PHOSITA to make TAM. Under the above premises,
even if the prior art reference did not disclose all the technological
features of TAM, TAM was still in the prior art, and therefore lacked
novelty.48
A number of commentators suggested that despite the U.K.
decision of Marion Merrell Dow Inc. referencing earlier EPO cases,
inconsistencies still remained between this decision and the EPO’s
conservative attitude toward applying inherent anticipation doctrine.
In previous EPO cases, the boards of appeal held that a prior
reference inherently disclosing the technological features of the
disputed invention is insufficient to anticipate this invention and
defeat its novelty. Prior art references must actually “convey”
technological features to the public for the disputed invention to be
found not novel. Thus, even if the implementations of technologies

46. Mobil Oil III / Friction-Reducing Additive, No. G 2/88, [1990] O.J. EPO 93 (Bd.
App. Dec. 11, 1989).
47. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., [1996] R.P.C. at 84.
48. Id. at 87.
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from prior art references unavoidably allow people to practice later
claimed inventions, those inventions should still be recognized as
undisclosed as long as the references themselves do not explicitly
convey any technological features of these inventions to a
PHOSITA.49 This position is contrary to the view expressed by the
U.K. House of Lords in Merrell Dow. However, the decisions by the
EPO have only referential value and are not mandatory for the courts
in EPC member states. Given these contradictory stances by the EPO
and U.K. House of Lords, it remains to be seen whether the EPC
members would resolve this issue and develop a harmonized common
approach.50
In brief, the United States and various European countries have
diverged in their solutions to the problem of active metabolite patents.
After Schering Corp., the U.K. and U.S. approaches appear to
converge. Both counties adopted the inherent anticipation doctrine
denying novelty to active metabolites on the basis of earlier technical
disclosure of the drug that converts in vivo into the metabolite. Under
this doctrine, patents are granted only for active metabolites that are
purified or synthesized in vitro.51 Thus, the United Kingdom and the
United States displayed a more narrow and restrictive attitude towards
the patentability of active metabolites.
V. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN INDIAN LAW
Regarding active metabolite patents, Section 3(d) of India’s 2005
Patents (Amendment) Act and the explanation passed together with
the Amendment recognize metabolites as “new types of known
substances”, in principle considered identical to known substances
and thus unpatentable. Only those metabolites that differ significantly
in their characteristics regarding efficacy are deemed patentable.52
49. Christopher Floyd, Novelty under the Patents Act 1977: The State of the Art after
Merrell Dow, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 480, 483 (1996).
50. Similar to the United States, there is also a U.K. decision that held active metabolites
infringing on the original compound claims under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g.,
Beecham Grp. Ltd. v. Bristol Labs. Ltd., [1978] R.P.C. 153 (UKHL 1977).
51. For further discussion of the inherent anticipation doctrine, see infra Part VII.B.
52. Section 3 of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, No. 15, Acts of
Parliament, 2005 (India) provides the following:
[T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere
use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results
in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers,
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Furthermore, the Indian Patent Office and the High Courts have held
that substantial increase in bioavailability, physical or chemical
stability do not satisfy this exception of enhancement of the known
efficacy.53 Accordingly, obtaining patents for active metabolites in
India is extraordinarily difficult.
The attitude of India is surely adverse and restrictive towards
awarding metabolite patents. Typically, scholars in the developing
world believe that active metabolites are “natural products” from
known substances. They are not “creations” or “inventions,” and thus
should not be patentable, regardless of whether they are formed
through metabolism or synthesized in vitro.54 Before the 2005
Amendment the India Patent Office originally adopted a similar
position. In particular, the 2005 Draft Manual of Patent Practice and
Procedure of the Office stipulated that active metabolites are not
patentable, regardless of whether their efficacy differs from the
original drugs.55 Thus, scholars have speculated whether the addition
of the enhanced efficacy exception to the 2005 Amendment was just
to conform to Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement),
which provides that inventions in any field of technology may apply
for and equally enjoy patent protection without prejudice.56
VI. NOTEWORTHY COURT DECISIONS IN TAIWAN
There is no provision in Taiwan’s patent law or patent
examination guidelines to address the problem of active metabolites.
As for court decisions, a 2008 case by the Intellectual Property Court
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers,
complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be
considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties
with regard to efficacy.
Id.
53. Susan Fyan, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and Section 3(D): A Comparative
Look at India and the U.S., 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 198, 210-11, 216-17 (2010).
54. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents:
Developing a Public Health Perspective 18 (Univ. of Buenos Aires, Working Paper, 2007),
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Correa_Patentability%20Guidelines.pdf.
55. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (DRAFT) app. I §
5.4, at 140 (2005) (India).
56. Linda L. Lee, Note, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG
v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 282-85, 292-95 (2008); Tanuja V. Garde,
Circumventing the Debate over State Policy and Property Rights: Section 3(d) of the Indian
Patents Act Law, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD:
LIBER AMICORUM JOSEPH STRAUS 243, 246-50 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al.
eds., 2009).
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(IP Court), a specialty court with priority jurisdiction over IP cases,57
illustrated the attitude of Taiwanese judges towards this type of
patents.58 The plaintiff in this case was the Japanese Takeda
Pharmaceutical Company that initially held a patent for the
combination of an anti-diabetic drug, brand-named Actos, and other
anti-diabetic drugs. Takeda later acquired Patent No. 63119 (’119
patent) for a tetrahydrothiazolyl-thione derivative, which is the
metabolite of Actos’ active ingredient, pioglitazone hydrochloride.
Pioglitazone itself and the active metabolite were both responsible for
causing the desired anti-diabetic effects in the human body. The
defendant in this case was China Chemical & Pharmaceutical Co.,
Ltd. (CCPC), a Taiwanese pharmaceutical company, which intended
to manufacture and sell a generic version of pioglitazone after the
Actos patent expired. CCPC filed with the Taiwanese Food and Drug
Administration (TFDA) and obtained a drug license on July 12, 2006.
Takeda later filed an infringement suit against CCPC based on the
’119 patent.59
Takeda argued that patients necessarily produce the metabolite
through metabolism after consuming the generic drug of pioglitazone.
However, patients were unaware of this metabolic process, which
occurred unconsciously, and in reality equated to a tool for CCPC to
infringe the metabolite patent. Therefore, by manufacturing and
selling this drug CCPC directly infringed Takeda’s ’119 patent of the
pioglitazone metabolite. Alternatively, CCPC knowingly aided
patients in infringing the ’119 patent, resulting in indirect
infringement of this patent by CCPC.60 The defendant countered that
the ’119 patent lacked novelty and non-obviousness, and was thus
invalid on grounds of the metabolite having previously been disclosed
in the pertinent literature and pharmacopoeia. In light of this
disclosure any person could have produced the metabolite by simply
consuming pioglitazone, leading a PHOSITA to easily create the
metabolite. In the alternative, CCPC argued that regardless of the
57. Taiwan’s IP Court enjoys priority jurisdiction over civil and administrative IP
litigations in the first and second instances, and criminal IP litigations only in the second
instance.
58. Rishang Wutian Yaopin Gongye Gufen Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Huaxue Zhiyao
Gufen Youxian Gongsi (日商武田藥品工業股份有限公司, 中國化學製藥股份有限公司)
[Takeda Pharm. Co. v. China Chem. & Pharm. Co.], 97 Civil Patent Suit Judgment No. 5 (Intell.
Prop. Ct., Oct. 28, 2008) (Taiwan), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 97 Civil Patent Appeals
Judgment No. 20 (Intell. Prop. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009) (Taiwan), available at
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm.
59. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶¶ 1.1, 1.3.
60. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 1.4.
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’119 patent’s validity it did not directly infringed the ’119 patent,
since it did not manufacture or sell the metabolite, but rather
pioglitazone. Consequently, the defendant should not be responsible
for inducement or contributory infringement of the patent.61
The IP Court’s division of first instance ruled that the ’119
patent is valid but that the defendant did not infringe it. In the
judgment, the court did not expound on the patent’s validity, but
instead merely analyzed whether infringement had occurred. With
regard to direct infringement, the court noted that the defendant
produced generic drugs that only contained pioglitazone not the
metabolite of the ’119 patent. The active ingredient recorded in the
defendant’s instruction label also was pioglitazone that differed in its
chemical structure from the claimed metabolite. The court held that
the plaintiff could not expand the scope of the ’119 patent scope to
include pioglitazone. Furthermore, although pioglitazone converted
into the claimed metabolite after natural metabolism in the human
body, this was not the result of human controlled will or effort, nor it
did involve any commercial sales or advertisement. Thus, the
defendant’s actions were not related to practicing the invention of the
’119 patent. The plaintiff argued that consumption of pioglitazone by
third parties (patients) with the drug’s conversion into the ’119
patent’s metabolite within the human body constituted “direct
manufacturing” and “use” by the defendant. The court explicitly
rejected the plaintiff’s inference of a third parties’ acts being the
deliberate consequence of the defendant’s acts.62
On indirect infringement, the court noted that “inducement”
refers to the formation of intention after notification and
encouragement by others, whereas “contributory infringement”
referred to assisting the direct infringer to fulfill her existing
intentions. However, indirect infringement still requires that direct
infringers understand the consequences of their acts, which was not
the case here. Moreover, the defendant only sold a generic drug
containing pioglitazone without the instruction label notifying
patients that digesting the drug would result in the metabolite of the
’119 patent, and refrained from encouraging patients to “intentionally
manufacture” this metabolite. As a result, the court found the
defendant’s acts to be inconsistent with the elements of inducement
and contributory infringement.63
61.
62.
63.

Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 2.4.
Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.4.
Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.4.
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Upon appeal the IP Court’s appellate division agreed with the
opinion from the division of first instance, holding that the disputed
patent was valid, but that the defendant did not directly or indirectly
infringe the ’119 patent.64 Regarding validity, the appellate court
found the appellee’s evidence only contained basic drug activity tests
relating to pioglitazone and its analogs, but lacking the claimed
metabolite, and therefore failed to prove lack of novelty of the ’119
patent.65 Concerning direct and joint infringement, the appellate court
reasoned similarly to the division of first instance’s opinion.
This case illustrates that Taiwan’s patent law has not adopted the
inherent anticipation doctrine to refute the novelty of active
metabolite patents. Rather, according to the Taiwanese IP Court the
metabolite production through unconscious human metabolism does
not constitute practicing the invention of metabolite patents. The court
found that there was no basis for finding for inducement and
contributory infringement due to the lack of direct infringing
practices. The ruling paved the way for generic drugs to the market
despite patents covering the active metabolites of those generic drugs.
Notably, Taiwan has not expressly codified indirect infringement in
its patent law. Metabolite patent holders who wish to claim their
rights from generic drug manufacturers in the name of inducement or
contributory infringement can only resort to the joint infringement
provision under the Taiwanese tort law, where the direct infringer’s
intention or negligence plays a potential role in determining indirect
infringement. Thus, in terms of statutory provisions for indirect
infringement, differences arise to other countries.
VII.THEORETICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND
TRANSNATIONAL CATEGORIZATION
The countries discussed above demonstrate contradicting
attitudes towards active metabolite patents. No consistent solution has
emerged for those patents possibly preventing generic drugs from
entering the market place even after patents for the generic drugs have
expired. In this chapter, the authors introduce a technological analysis
and insightful theoretical perspectives to rationally assess the various
different approaches. Plausible solutions are then summarized for a

64. Rishang Wutian Yaopin Gongye Gufen Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Huaxue Zhiyao
Gufen Youxian Gongsi (日商武田藥品工業股份有限公司, 中國化學製藥股份有限公司)
[Takeda Pharm. Co. v. China Chem. & Pharm. Co.], 97 Civil Patent Appeals Judgment No. 20
(Intell. Prop. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009) (Taiwan), available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm.
65. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.3.3.4-.5.
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separate and more focused investigation and deliberation.
A. A Portion of Active Metabolites Deserves Patent Protection
When considering how the patent law treats active metabolites,
the focus of that task hinges on whether those metabolites deserve
patent protection. Commentators have indicated that metabolites and
original compounds before metabolism are just two forms of the same
substance. Although their chemical structures differ, chemical
formulae are only the “textual” manifestation for documenting
chemical compounds. Although the external appearances of
compounds prior to metabolism and their active metabolites differ,
the two actually possess the same pharmacology, treating the same
physiological effects. Thus, the differences between the two are
insubstantial and negligible, existing only in the appearance and the
“textual” form of documentation. In essence, they exert identical
treatment results. Pursuant to this line of thought, active metabolites
seem to lack the value for patent protection.66
This article argues nonetheless that a portion of active
metabolites may possess characteristics that differ from those of the
compounds before metabolism. Those characteristics may cause the
metabolites to have unique value and significance in pharmacological
and medical practice, which makes them worthy of patent protection.
Consider the case of diazepam and oxazepam as an example.
Diazepam is a pre-metabolic compound, whereas oxazepam is an
active metabolite of diazepam following metabolism. The two use the
same pharmacological mechanism to sedate and relax the patient’s
muscles. However, diazepam was later found to have a longer
sedative effect than oxazepam. Thus, physicians typically prescribe
diazepam as a sleep medication. By contrast, oxazepam has only a
brief sedative effect. Thus, oxazepam is rather used as a tranquilizer
not as a sleep medication. Additionally, because oxazepam does not
require hepatic metabolism, it is less harmful to liver function than
diazepam and more appropriate for older adults and patients with liver
disease.67
The diazepam-oxazepam example shows that active metabolites
are not merely the flip side of pre-metabolic compounds. The
66. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 386 (2005); Shayana Kadidal,
Digestion as Infringement: The Problem of Pro-Drugs, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
241, 249 (1996).
67. N.A. Buckley et al., Relative Toxicity of Benzodiazepines in Overdose, 310 BRIT.
MED.
J.
219
(1995),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2548618/pdf/bmj00577-0021.pdf.
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differences between the two are not necessarily restricted to their
chemical structure. In practice, many active metabolites differ from
pre-metabolic compounds in their side effects, prolonged
effectiveness, and mechanisms of action.68 This proves that active
metabolites are not merely another form of pre-metabolic compounds,
but constitute at least in some instances new and unique substances.
Therefore, active metabolites are potentially valuable and deserving
of patent protection.
The patent law was established to award a period of exclusivity
to encourage research and promote the accumulation and disclosure
of technical knowledge. In contrast, the patent law also guarantees the
public to freely utilize patented inventions, servicing public interest,
after the patents to those inventions have expired. Considering active
metabolite patents a restrictive attitude should be adopted if the goal
is to guarantee the public’s free use of medicines from expired
patents. However, this runs contrary to the patent law’s to encourage
innovation and promote public disclosure. If active metabolites are
deemed unpatentable, the patent law provides no incentive to the
further study of unknown pharmacological metabolisms. It would also
fail to provide incentives for inventors to disclose newly-found active
metabolites. However, if the emphasis is to encourage research and
disclosure of new and useful metabolic compounds and mechanisms,
the public may be denied access to affordable generic drugs from
expired patents.69
Metabolic mechanisms and active metabolites have been
identified as having potential value in pharmacological and medical
practice as described above. How patent law should treat active
metabolites in order to adequately satisfy its many policy objectives is
a difficult but important task. Below, the authors put forward three
possible solutions to address this issue based on various countries’
jurisprudence, including comments on their usefulness and feasibility.
B. Possible Mode I: Inherent Anticipation Doctrine
The U.K. and the U.S. courts mainly employed the inherent
anticipation doctrine to refute the patentability of active metabolites.70
Under this doctrine, novelty is lost based on known pre-metabolic
compounds, and patents cannot claim the scope of the invention to
include active metabolites formed upon metabolizing those pre68.
69.
70.

Correa, supra note 54, at 18.
Frost, supra note 40, at 369, 377-78.
See supra Part III.B; supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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metabolic compounds. Thus, this doctrine can effectively resolve
problems with active metabolite patents, which otherwise would
prevent generic drugs of those metabolites from entering the market
place. However, when the scope of the claims is expressly limited to
include only active metabolites that have been purified or were
synthesized in vitro, those claims fall outside the realm of inherent
anticipation. The latter case preserves the incentive to research and
disclose new metabolic mechanisms and compounds. The inherent
anticipation doctrine consequently appears to be a suitable model for
addressing active metabolites in patent law.
On the other hand, over utilizing the inherent anticipation
doctrine can lead to broadly expanding and distorting the doctrine
itself. This doctrine bridges the gap between written technical features
in a prior art reference and the genuine features of the referenced
technology. Occasionally, prior art references do not disclose in
writing all the technical features of an invention, but on the basis of
their professional experience and knowledge, PHOSITAs can still
realize the omitted, but implied features. This situation led to the rise
of the inherent anticipation doctrine, which allowed judges and patent
examiners to recite technical features that were not expressly written
into the specification of a prior patent but could be discerned from it
by the PHOSITA to refute novelty of later patents. This application of
the doctrine avoids awarding or maintaining patents on inventions
that appear novel on its face but have lacked novelty in substance
from the PHOSITA’s point of view.71
However, the doctrine originally was applied in a situation quite
different from the active metabolite patents, where a PHOSITA could
not necessarily discern the omitted but in-fact-present technical
features from the prior art reference. The early leading case of the
inherent anticipation doctrine, Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto
Co.,72 amply demonstrates the doctrine’s original meaning and
function. Continental Can’s patent covered a plastic can having
hollow ribs. Continental Can sued Monsanto for infringing its patent.
During litigation, Monsanto provided a prior art reference disclosing a
container with hollow ribs.73 However, the reference itself did not
expressly disclose the ribs to be hollow, but instead that the ribs were
manufactured according to conventional blow molding techniques.74
71.
72.
73.
74.

Herbert, supra note 40, at 116-17.
Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1267-68.
Id.
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In its decision, the CAFC noted that in determining novelty extrinsic
evidence could complement a prior art reference that does not
expressly disclose certain technological features. If the extrinsic
evidence shows that common knowledge in the technical field could
fill the gap, and thus enable the PHOSITA to recognize the omitted
features from the reference, those absent features have actually been
implicitly disclosed in the prior art. If all technological features of an
invention are simultaneously disclosed in a single prior art reference,
the invention lacks novelty and the patent should be invalidated. In
this case, if extrinsic evidence demonstrates that blow molding
techniques invariably generate hollow ribs, which is also recognized
by the PHOSITA, then the prior art has implicitly disclosed the
“hollow ribs” feature.75 Consequently, the CAFC remanded the case
for further proceeding to clarify this factual issue.
The Continental Can case showed that two conditions are
necessary for applying the inherent anticipation doctrine: (1) the
omitted technological features are inherently present as disclosed in
the prior art reference; (2) a PHOSITA could recognize the omitted
features on the basis of the prior art reference. In Schering Corp., in
sharp contrast, the CAFC changed the requirements for applying this
doctrine, and now only the first condition has to be met. The second
condition since then has been dropped from the inherency analysis.76
This development has raised controversies and intense discussions
regarding its fairness and the suitable criteria for the doctrine to
apply.77
For applying the inherent anticipation doctrine, the authors
contend that the second condition in the Continental Can decision
should still be maintained. Excluding the criterion that the PHOSITA
is able to recognize the omitted features is contrary to the original
purpose of the doctrine, which was based on the premises to have the
PHOSITA’s general knowledge assist in interpreting the prior art
reference. Furthermore, the doctrine will be inconsistent with the
settled concepts of “prior arts” and “novelty” as used in patent law.
75. Id. at 1268-69. See also MUELLER, supra note 8, at 129-31.
76. The turning point of the U.S. case law concerning the inherent anticipation doctrine is
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Irving N. Feit &
Christina L. Warrick, Inherency in Patent Law, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 19-21
(2003); Todd R. Miller, Patented Compounds Inherently Coproduced as Trace Impurities:
Issues of Inherent Anticipation and Literal Infringement, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 452 (2004).
77. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,
372-74 (2005); Steven C. Carlson, Inherent Anticipation, 40 IDEA 297, 306-18 (2000); Feit &
Warrick, supra note 76, at 21; Herbert, supra note 40, at 113-14; Miller, supra note 76, at 442;
Mueller & Chisum, supra note 37, at 1102-05.
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Prior art refers to technical knowledge that already falls within the
public domain, whereas novelty identifies new information that is still
privately held outside of the public domain. If the requirement of
PHOSITA’s recognition were eliminated, technological features
unknown to the PHOSITA would be deemed prior art that would
defeat the novelty of these features. However, since these features
have never been explicitly disclosed to the public or are known to the
PHOSITA, the public will in all actuality be unable to use or share the
technology associated with these features. The core quid pro quo in
patent law rests on the public freely and openly learning, sharing, and
utilizing these technologies and other types of information while
granting a limited monopoly to the inventor. Thus, neglecting the
PHOSITA recognition requirement will result in serious
contradictions with the widely accepted notions of public domain and
novelty.78 Therefore, the authors conclude that PHOSITA’s
recognition should be required when applying the inherent
anticipation doctrine.
Turning back to the issue of active metabolites, if the
PHOSITA’s recognition requirement is reinstated, metabolite patents
may not be inherently anticipated by prior art disclosing their
corresponding pre-metabolic drugs. Since the PHOSITA cannot
identify any technological features of the active metabolites from the
prior art reference, patents for those metabolites can still retain their
novelty under this doctrine. The authors hence believe that the
inherent anticipation doctrine, if applied in this manner, would not be
a suitable model to resolve the controversies regarding active
metabolite patents.
C. Possible Mode II: Product of Nature Doctrine
Turning to active metabolite patents and patent evergreening, a
number of commentators suggested employing the product of nature
doctrine to confront this problem.79 For example, § 101 of the U.S.
Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) specifies the scope of patentable
78. Herbert, supra note 40, at 123. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 77, at 374.
79. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350-51
(Fed. Cir. 2001); ICN Pharm., Inc. v. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1051
(C.D. Cal. 2003); Burk & Lemley, supra note 77, at 403-08; Cynthia Chen, Note, Schering
Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and
Its Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 113 (2005); Herbert, supra note 40, at 143-45. See
also Torrance, supra note 14, at 1500-05. Torrance puts forth a physiological steps doctrine,
which considers products and processes of in vivo conversion are unpatentable subject matters.
The essence of that doctrine and the natural product doctrine is quite similar, and from the
authors’ point of view could be effectively classified into the same category. Id.
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subject matters to include any invention or discovery on a “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”80 The term
“discovery” in this section does not refer to the original meaning of
the term, but instead constitutes a synonym for invention.81 Pure
discovery of natural products or phenomena is still not an invention
that is patentable under § 101.82 In Gottschalk v. Benson,83 the U.S.
Supreme Court set up the taxonomy of unpatentable subject matters to
comprise laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. The
court noted that those types of discoveries are the collective treasures
of the human race, which should be shared by the general public
without constraint, and thus may not be preempted by patent
owners.84 In the same vein, Taiwan’s patent examination guidelines
espouse similar rules, stating that pure scientific discoveries of
objects, phenomena, and laws that are inherent in the natural world
are not patentable subject matters.85
At the extreme end of the spectrum, India’s patent law adopts an
entirely negative attitude toward active metabolite patents. It posits
that active metabolites are fundamentally products of nature and
should not be granted patents. The rationale of this position is that the
identification of active metabolites is merely a discovery, not an
invention, involving a level of technological innovation that is
relatively low. Thus, awarding process patents with weaker
exclusivity should be appropriate, whereas product patents granting
stronger exclusivity in exchange for disclosure are deemed
unnecessary and too restrictive.86 On this basis, active metabolites are
excluded from patent protection, regardless whether they are
produced through metabolism or in vitro.
The authors propose that the product of nature doctrine may lend
itself to mitigate the problems caused by active metabolite patents.
Nevertheless, the doctrine does not necessarily refute patentability of
80. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
81. ALBERT HENRY WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA § 2, at 2 (2d ed. 1889).
82. See Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 F. 480, 481 (3d Cir. 1923); Morton v. N.Y. Eye
Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
83. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
84. Id. at 71-72.
85. Faming Zhuanli Shiti Shencha (發明專利實體審查) [Patent Examination Guidelines]
(promulgated by Intell. Prop. Office, Ministry of Econ. Affairs in 1994, effective on Nov. 27,
1994, as revised in 2004) tit. 2, ch. 2, sec. 1.3.2 (Taiwan).
86. Herbert, supra note 40, at 144-46.
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natural substances that are purified or synthesized in vitro. The U.S.
patent law, for instance, holds that if those substances were obtained
by human intervention and differ sufficiently from products as found
in their natural states, they can still meet the requirement under § 101
and thus are deemed patentable subject matters.87 Currently, a number
of judicial U.S. decisions held that natural products in their purified
states are patentable.88 This rule was first articulated in the ParkeDavis case.89 Here, the disputed invention involved epinephrine in its
purified state. Because epinephrine is an important hormone naturally
secreted and formed in the human body, it is undoubtedly a “product
of nature.” In this case, the inventor Takamine developed a method of
separating epinephrine from glandular tissue, which resulted in
epinephrine unadulterated by other organic matter. Takamine applied
for patents of the separation method and purified epinephrine.90
However, using epinephrine for treatment purposes was already
established in the medical field prior to Takamine’s separation
method. The traditional practice included air-drying and crushing
animal adrenal glands prior to dissolving them into an organic
solution. This solution, which comprised a number of organic residual
substances, was then injected into the patient for treatment with some
of these substances being harmful to the patient.91 With regard to the
patentability of epinephrine in its purified state, the court stated that
no regulations indicated that extracts of products of nature are
unpatentable. The court further noted that Takamine was the first
person to separate epinephrine from glandular tissue. As for its
medical benefit, the unadulterated epinephrine was actually a brand
new substance with substantial commercial and therapeutic value.
Consequently, the court held epinephrine in its purified state to be
worthy of patent protection.92
In light of the tremendous value of purified or synthesized
products of nature, as in the case of purified epinephrine, the product
of nature doctrine under the U.S. law that distinguishes between in
vitro and metabolically produced substances provides an excellent

87. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 226.
88. W. Lesser, Nature or Nurture: Is There a Case Basis for a Judicially Created
‘Product of Nature’ Exclusion? Are Genes Somehow Different?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 318, 347-50 (2011).
89. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d. Cir. 1912).
90. Id. at 97.
91. Id. at 106.
92. Id. at 103.
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approach for assessing patentability of materials with natural origins.
Regarding active metabolites, the example of diazepam and its
metabolite, oxazepam, demonstrated that active metabolites might,
too, possess unique pharmacological properties that are different from
those of their original pre-metabolic compounds.93 The discovery of
unadulterated active metabolites and the process of in vitro
production through isolation and purification or synthesis thus
represent technological progress. The distinction between adulterated
metabolites formed through natural metabolism and those that are
purified or synthesized in vitro may strike a desirable balance
between assuring affordable medicine and promoting pharmaceutical
innovation. Declining patents for in vivo metabolites prevents patent
evergreening and could accelerate the market entry of generic drugs.
On the other hand, affording patent protection for purified or in vitro
synthesized metabolites may provide a proper incentive for valuable
pharmaceutical development. For these reasons, the authors believe
that unadulterated active metabolites that are produced in vitro are
worthy of the protection afforded under the patent system.
However, some shortcoming of product of nature doctrine may
be fatal despite this doctrine trying to adequately address the issue of
active metabolite patents. The most serious problem lies with this
doctrine’s unpredictability. What falls under products of nature is
considerably ambiguous. There is no settled meaning or definite
scope for this concept in patent law. The intuition of judges or
examiners regarding the disputed subject matter may sometimes
become a controlling factor. For instance, the patentability of DNA
sequences had once been settled for more than ten years. But in recent
years, it has been fiercely challenged in the Association for Molecular
Pathology case in U.S. courtrooms. The district court found in 2010
that isolated DNA did not possess markedly different characteristics
from those of natural DNA in human cells despite their structural and
functional differences, and thus was unpatentable under the product of
nature doctrine.94 On appeal, the CAFC overturned the decision of the
lower court,95 which was in turn vacated by the Supreme Court and
remanded for further consideration96 in view of Mayo Collaborative
93. For detailed explanation of diazepam and oxazepam see supra Part VII.A.
94. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 227-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
96. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., where the Court recently
held another type of subject matters unpatentable as a law of nature.97
This contentious case illuminates the uncertainty and divergence
about the character and scope of unpatentable natural products.
The situation is further exacerbated by mutual overlap between
different types of unpatentable subject matters. New development in
one category of unpatentable subject matters may create percussions
for another. Before deciding on its merits, the Supreme Court
remanded the Mayo Collaborative Services case,98 requiring the
Federal Circuit to reconsider it in light of Bilski v. Kappos,99 a newly
delivered Supreme Court decision concerning abstract ideas—a third
category of unpatentable subject matters. The invention at issue in
Mayo Collaborative Services—methods for measuring proper dosage
of thiopurine to treat autoimmune diseases,100 is quite dissimilar to the
claimed invention in Bilski, where the applicant filed for patents on
methods of hedging risk in energy trading market.101 The underlying
rationales for the Supreme Court to rule the subject matter to be
unpatentable in those two cases diverge considerably. However, the
mutual impact and chain reaction among different types of
unpatentable subject matters, as illustrated in Bilski, Mayo
Collaborative Services and Association for Molecular Pathology,
demonstrate instability spread from one group to another. This
phenomenon significantly intensifies the uncertainty in securing
patents and casts unnecessary doubts on products with natural origins.
For these reasons elaborated above in this section, those that originate
from human bodies yet purified or synthesized in vitro should be
adequately awarded patent protection. In light of the serious
shortcomings of instability and uncertainty, the product of nature
doctrine would not be an appropriate solution to the issue of active
metabolite patents.
D. Possible Mode III: Non-Practice Theory
Besides dealing with active metabolites through the principles of
patentability, Taiwan’s IP Court utilized an alternative approach by
97. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (holding
that claims directed to the relationship between the concentrations of blood metabolites and
response to a therapeutic drug are not eligible for a patent because they incorporate laws of
nature).
98. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
99. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
100. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1295-96.
101. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
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way of assessing infringement. In the Takeda v. CCPC case,102 the
court found that although the generic version of pioglitazone
produced the patented active metabolite through metabolism in
humans, this in vivo production was entirely unknown to any patient
taking pioglitazone. A patient was not capable of controlling the
metabolic process by his or her own will or acts, nor did it involve
any commercial sales of the claimed active metabolite. Thus, the
court ruled that the metabolic production was unrelated to the
practicing of the asserted metabolite patent, hence did not constitute
patent infringement.103
In its decision, the Taiwanese IP Court articulated a “nonpractice theory” to confront the problem of market entry barrier that
generic drugs suffer owing to active metabolite patents. As for
patients that take generic drugs, patents on those drugs either expired
or were ruled invalid. What patients consciously consume are
medicines that are already beyond the term of patent exclusivity.
Although active metabolites are in reality formed inside the patients’
bodies by taking these generics, these patients could hardly know
about the metabolites being produced inside their bodies. They may
not know that their metabolism produces these active metabolites, nor
do they consciously force their bodies to manufacture or use these
claimed metabolites. Given the fact that this unconscious metabolism
is not self-inflicted by those patients, it may not be reasonably
counted as a human act that could be culpable for legal liability and
punishment.104 Actually, metabolism is a chemical process that the
patients cannot control or intervene by their own will. Thus, it would
be absurd to hold these patients accountable for such unconscious and
involuntary processes that quietly carry on in their bodies. From this
point of view, under a non-practice theory in vivo metabolism should
be excluded from the scope of infringing acts under the patent law.
The non-practice approach just exempts metabolic reactions in
human bodies from infringement liability. It still maintains patent
protection over active metabolites that are purified or synthesized in
102. See supra Part VI.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61 for further details in this case.
104. See, e.g., People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 404-05 (Ct. App. 1970). The court
stated that unconsciousness, when not self-induced (e.g., voluntary intoxication), is a complete
defense to a criminal act. Id. Unconsciousness need not be confined to physical dimensions as
commonly associated with the term; it can exist mentally as well, where the person in fact acts,
but is not at the time conscious of her action. Id. at 405. See also United States v. GracidasUlibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 n.11 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that sleepwalking falls within the
category of unconscious behavior and that the act a person commits during sleepwalking is not
criminally culpable); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(b) (1962).
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vitro. This distinction adequately controls the claim scope of active
metabolite patents, striking a fine balance between protecting
pharmaceutical inventions and making medicine more affordable. It
also avoids the problems of patent evergreening and preventing
market entry by generic pharmaceuticals, both caused by a
proliferation of secondary patents.105 Unlike the product of nature
doctrine, whose basic rationale is rooted in the vague concept of a
natural world without human intervention, this theory in particular is
based on the concept of unconsciousness that is a unique
characteristics of in vivo processes such as metabolism and digestion.
This focused underlying rationale enables the theory to have an
unambiguous connotation and clear scope of application, preventing
the shortcomings of instability and uncertainty, from which the
product of nature doctrine has suffered.
One of the main functions that the patent system performs is to
provide incentive for inventors to improve upon existing
technologies.106 Some commentators have argued that inventing upon
patents is socially wasteful in that it might attract investment to the
task of finding redundant solutions to already solved problems.107 It is
undeniable, on the other hand, that designing around an invention is
the most common and feasible method to mitigate blockages that
patents bring about.108 Relatively, compound patents are difficult to
invent around due to their respective idiosyncrasies. A good approach
that releases active metabolites generated in vivo from infringement
liability, such as the non-practice theory, may provide a significant
conduit for inventing around in the pharmaceutical field. When
researchers successfully identify the pre-metabolic compound of a
patented drug through endeavors, they may make use of the leeway
for active metabolites as discussed above to compete with the drug on
the market. Those pre-metabolic compounds are called “pro-drugs.”
They can be induced to convert into the patented medicine through

105. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94 for further explanation.
106. State Indus., Inc. v. A. O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); ROGER
E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 289 (2003); Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting
and Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties,
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 265, 325 (2008).
107. E.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 51 (Comm. Print
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup).
108. John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off Switches”: PatentInfringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1408-09 (2012).
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metabolism inside of the patient’s body.109 If the patented drug and
pro-drug accomplish substantially the same function and result in
substantially the same way, the doctrine of equivalents becomes
applicable and the pro-drug would still infringe on the drug patent.
Otherwise, the non-practice theory could provide a feasible way for
pharmaceutical inventing around, a common practice in other fields of
technology.110
VIII.CONCLUSION
This article begins with an overview of transnational
jurisprudence in tackling the problem of active metabolite patents,
which may instigate drug patent evergreening and hence delaying the
market entry of generic medicine. The United States and the United
Kingdom adopt the inherent anticipation doctrine, considering active
metabolites as inherent in prior art references concerning the
corresponding pre-metabolic compounds, usually the active
ingredients of the drug, and therefore refute novelty of those
metabolite claims. The authors believe this approach removes the key
component of PHOSITA recognition from the notion of prior arts,
hence stretching the novelty analysis too thin. It runs against the
settled meaning of the public domain as well.
India’s patent law traces an extreme position in the aspect of the
product of nature doctrine. Metabolites are by definition products of
metabolism, a process of nature. Based on this reason, Indian law
categorically treats metabolites as products of nature, one type of
well-recognized unpatentable subject matters. There are also more
modest versions of the product of nature doctrine, which still retain
patent protection for metabolites purified or synthesized in vitro. No
matter which version of the doctrine, however, they all suffer from
instability and uncertainty with regard to patentability determination.
The critical shortcoming makes this approach unadvisable.
Taiwan’s IP Court suggests a third approach, the non-practice
theory. In light of the unconsciousness of metabolism in vivo, this
theory exempts the use and production of metabolites in human
bodies from the scope of infringing practices under patent law. This
109. Kadidal, supra note 66, at 241-42.
110. See id. at 241-43 (noting that the practice of using pro-drugs to design around
pharmaceutical patents has existed for decades, but the controversies concerning active
metabolites are relatively new). The introduction of the non-practice theory would clear the
blockage from metabolite patents and stabilize the original status of pro-drugs. Enormous
expansion of inventing around and pro-drug competition, on the other hand, might not come into
being eventually.
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new approach distinguishes between metabolites unconsciously
produced in vivo and those purified or synthesized in vitro, striking a
right balance between encouraging pharmaceutical innovations and
providing affordable medicine. Following the in vivo-in vitro
distinction, the theory adequately curbs the claim scope of active
metabolite patents, increasing affordable medicine by more market
entry of generics and inventing around through pro-drugs. The article
is confident that the non-practice theory should be a preferable
approach to confronting the problems that patents for active
metabolites may generate.

